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Early design goals for email

• Work over weakly connected networks

- E.g., early Internet, UUCP, etc.
- Move mail closer to recipient whenever you can...
- Because sender might not be available later on

• Provide reliable transmission and delivery:

"When the receiver-SMTP accepts a piece of mail... it is accepting responsibility for delivering or relaying the message. It must take this responsibility seriously... If there is a delivery failure after acceptance of a message, the receiver-SMTP MUST formulate and mail a notification message."
 RFC 2821

Architectural consequences

- Any random host can *send* email
 - Dynamic/temporary IP address or NAT is just fine
 - No authentication, as any host may relay for any other
 - Don't even need your own domain name; just forge it
- Only well-established servers can receive mail
 - Need permanent domain name & listening TCP port
 - Anyone can identify the server for a recipient address
- Servers must treat received mail as precious
- Surprise: Senders are abusing the system



Revisiting email's design goals

Should email be reliable?

- Yes! People still count on reliable email delivery
- Yet reliability is often a casualty of spam filtering
- Even if stock filters happen to work on *your* mail...

 "Most people can safely delete e-mail with subject lines like 'small dick,' 'anal-to-mouth action,' or 'lesbian-animal sex.'

 Not me. I have to open those because they could be legit...

 questions that touch on those distressing topics."
 - Dan Savage, advice columnist
- Should we accommodate weakly-connected, ephemeral clients?
 - No! Not unless they're your, authenticated clients

Principles

- Never accept email until you're sure the sender can receive a bounce.
- Never perform spam filtering *after* accepting responsibility for a message from a client.
 - Corollary: Filter at your organization's outermost mail relay
- Different mailboxes need different mail acceptance policies.
- Individual users should be able to have multiple mailboxes with different policies.
- Make it easy to implement these new policies.
 - Give users all possible information about incoming mail

Mail Avenger

• Email transmitted using SMTP protocol

- MAIL FROM client specifies sender address
- RCPT TO client specifies recipient
- DATA client sends body of mail message

• Idea: Put recipients in control of SMTP responses

- Allow RCPT or DATA to succeed, fail, or return temporary error based on recipient's policy


• Give users extension addresses

- I.e., user dm sets policy for dm+anything @mailavenger.org
- Can break policy into multiple files, just like qmail MTA

• Easy to implement new policies

- Policy specification is just a shell script

Avenger architecture



- SMTP daemon (asmtpd) enforces users' policies
- Delivery agent (avenger.local) handles extensions
- Useful utilities for use in policy shell scripts
- Uses existing MTA (sendmail, qmail, postfix, ...)

asmtpd checks

Check bounce addresses with DNS SPF records

- Can quickly reject forged mail "from" SPF-enabled domains

Check bounce addresses with SMTP servers

- Use SMTP callbacks
- Start to send bounce, but stop after RCPT (no DATA)
- If sender's server returns temporary/permanent error, do the same

Collect network-level information about client

- "SYN fingerprint" usually identifies client OS
- network route identifies BGP-hijacked address space

• Collect info on client's SMTP implementation

- E.g., eager pipelining, invalid "POST" command, ...

Avenger scripts

- Policy scripts in user home directories
 - dm@host.tld ⇒ ~dm/.avenger/rcpt
 - dm+ext@host.tld ⇒ ~dm/.avenger/rcpt+ext
 - Also rcpt+default catch all
- Environment variables contain client information
- Script augmented with shell functions
 - accept RCPT command succeeds immediately
 - reject RCPT command fails immediately
 - defer RCPT fails w. temporary error
 - bodytest specify script to run on DATA
 - Or fall through to default, or redirect to other user

Example: Preventing "Joe Jobs"

- Problem: Viruses forge your email address
 - You get tons of unwanted bounce messages
- Solution: Reject bounces to your main address
 - macutil utility generates temporary cookies
 - setenv MACUTIL_SENDER dm+bounce+*@host.tld
 - Send mail with macutil --sendmail (sendmail wrapper)
- ~/.avenger/rcpt:

```
test -z "$SENDER" && reject "no bounces, please"
```

• ~/.avenger/rcpt+bounce+default:

Example: List-specific addresses

- Want to subscribe to mailing lists at NYU & MIT
 - But don't want your address passed on to others
- Use SPF as a policy language to check client
 - To reduce latency SPF and DNS requests are asynchronous
 - setvars command waits for them to complete
- for dm+list@host.tld, use ~/.avenger/rcpt+list:

```
spf EDU_OK ptr:nyu.edu ptr:mit.edu mx:cs.nyu.edu/24
setvars
test "$EDU_OK" = pass && accept
test "$EDU_OK" = error && defer "Temp. DNS error"
reject "Address for NYU/MIT clients only"
```

Other Examples

• "Greylist" mail from Windows machines

```
match -q "*Windows*" "$CLIENT_SYNOS" && greylist
```


• Run spamassassin during SMTP session

```
errcheck
bodytest edinplace spamassassin -e 100
```

Conclusions

- Filter spam before assuming responsibility for messages
- Don't accept mail if sender won't accept bounce
 - Easy to originate TCP connections with viruses
 - Harder to set up domain and mail server to accept bounces
 - SPF adoption can prevent forgery...
 - and SMTP callbacks can encourage SPF adoption
- Different recipients need different policies
 - Individual users may even need multiple addresses
- Implementing policies is easy with Mail Avenger

Download it!



Mail Avenger is free software.

http://www.mailavenger.org/